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The 2020 U.S. elections produced a close, but clear, victory 
for Democratic nominee Joe Biden in the presidential contest, a 
surprisingly slim majority for the Democratic party in the House 
of Representatives, and an even 50-50 split between Republicans 
and Democrats in the Senate.1 Newly elected Democratic Vice 
President Kamala Harris holds the deciding vote for party control in 
the Senate. Thus, the Democratic party now controls the executive 
branch of the federal government and both Houses of Congress – a 
huge shift in the balance of political power.
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1 The Democrats elected 48 members to the 117th U.S. Congress, but two 
independent Senators caucus with the Democrats in party-control votes, which 
brings their effective number of Senate seats to 50.
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I.  What It Means for U.S. Economic Policy and Policy 
Making
Where Democrats can maintain strong party unity, they may pass 
significant legislation with little or no Republican support. For example, 
as of early February 2020, President Biden appears ready to ditch 
negotiations with Republicans and rely entirely, or almost entirely, 
on Democratic votes to enact another round of huge new government 
spending (Politii 2021). Whether the President’s stance is an effort 
to gain leverage in renewed negotiations or a genuine determination 
to press ahead without bipartisan support, it’s a safe bet the U.S. 
government will continue to run giant deficits in the near future. The 
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office projects U.S. budget deficits 
equal to 8.6 percent of GDP in 2021 and 6.1 percent in 2022.1 These 
deficits would push U.S. government debt held by the public to 107 
percent of GDP in 2023, the highest in American history. Because 
these projections don’t incorporate the $868 billion Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, enacted on 27 December 2020, or current 
Democratic proposals for another $1.9 trillion in fiscal support, actual 
deficits and debt levels are likely to be a good deal higher than these 
projections.
I expect President Biden to prevail in his pursuit of more large-scale 
government spending. Nevertheless, razor-thin Democratic majorities 
in the Congress will inhibit most major legislative initiatives that lack 
some measure of bipartisan support. For example, it is unlikely that 
Democrats can maintain enough unity to enact large tax hikes in 2021 
or 2022. I see little appetite among political leaders in Washington for a 
bipartisan compromise that shrinks future deficits, and little capacity 
for either party to impose its preferred mix of spending cuts, tax 
hikes, and growth-enhancing policy reforms. That is another reason to 
anticipate large deficits for at least the next two years. There will be no 
near-term reckoning with the unsustainable U.S. fiscal trajectory. 
Legislation that sharply curtails reliance on fossil fuels is also 
unlikely to pass the Congress under the current political configuration. 
Here, and in many other policy areas, the Biden administration will be 
tempted to rely on executive orders and regulatory actions to pursue 
1 See Table 2 in CBO (2020a).
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domestic policy goals that lack broad, bipartisan support. For the same 
reason, the administration will turn to international agreements not 
endorsed by the U.S. Congress in efforts to commit the United States to 
policy goals that don’t command a political majority. 
Judging by the flurry of executive orders promulgated in the early 
days of the Biden administration, non-legislative initiatives will indeed 
be a prominent feature of U.S. policymaking in 2021 and 2022.  During 
the first two weeks after President Biden took office, executive orders 
pertaining to energy and environmental concerns include the following:
•  Cancelling a permit to proceed with the Keystone XL oil pipeline, 
which has been embroiled in a highly politicized regulatory review 
process for more than a dozen years (BBC News 2021);
•  Rejoining the Paris Climate Accord (Politi and Manson 2021); and
•  Freezing new leases and permits for oil and gas development on 
federal lands (Lee 2021).
New White House guidance to the Office of Management and Budget 
will also give bureaucrats a freer hand to advance new regulations 
that do not meet a cost-benefit standard (Henderson 2021; Mulvaney 
and Grogan 2021). There is high potential for a rapid expansion of new 
regulations that lack broad-based political support and undermine 
prosperity.
Given the current configuration of political power, there is an obvious 
appeal to executive actions aimed at politically contentious issues. 
While the appeal is clear, so are the drawbacks. Policymaking by 
executive fiat will not serve President Biden’s stated goal of “bringing 
America together; uniting our people; and uniting our nation” (Biden 
2021). And when they lack broad political support, executive actions 
taken by one administration are easily undone by the next. The result is 
a highly uncertain policy outlook that inhibits investment, job creation, 
and regulatory goals (Baker et al. 2012; Davis 2017). That neither party 
has a strong hold on the national electorate raises the reversal risk 
for executive actions. Legislative enactments are much more durable, 
especially when they involve some degree of bipartisan support. 
II. The Outlook for Fed Monetary Policy
Under its new monetary policy framework, the Fed pledges not to 
raise its policy rate till it sees clear evidence of a sustained rise in 
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inflation above its 2% target (FOMC 2020). The new framework reflects 
several developments and re-assessments: First, U.S. monetary policy 
consistently undershot its inflation target in recent years, which the 
Fed attributes to challenges presented by the effective lower bound 
on the Fed’s policy rate. Second, close proximity of the policy rate to 
its effective lower bound is seen as likely to persist for many years. 
Hence, the need for a new framework that factors in the implications of 
the effective lower bound. Third, the search for an operational, stable 
Phillips Curve that can function as a reliable tool for assessing near-
term inflationary pressures has proved elusive, to put it mildly (e.g., 
Davis 2019). Fourth, and related, the United States enjoyed its lowest 
unemployment rates in half a century before COVID-19 struck – 
without the emergence of inflationary pressures. The third and fourth 
developments undercut arguments for tightening monetary policy in 
reaction to incipient or anticipated inflationary pressures.
The Fed currently plans to pursue an accommodative monetary 
policy with near-zero policy rates “until labor market conditions 
have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of 
maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is 
on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.” (Board of 
Governors 2021) The precise operational meaning of this guidance is 
unclear but, as explained in a recent speech by FOMC member Charles 
Evans, it may involve near-zero policy rates through 2025 or 2026. If so, 
we will see low nominal and real interest rates and a flat yield curve for 
several more years.
While that scenario is plausible, there is another plausible scenario 
in which inflation rises sharply enough in 2021 or 2022 to prompt the 
Fed to tighten monetary policy abruptly. How might such a scenario 
come about? First, a successful vaccine rollout that drastically curtails 
virus infection and reproduction rates, triggering a period of rapid 
output and employment growth. Second, a large burst of private 
spending as consumer-facing businesses re-open and return to normal 
operating practices. The U.S. personal savings rate shot upwards from 
7.5 percent in 2019 to 16.2 percent in 2020, its highest level in the past 
sixty years. Clearly, there is potential for an unusual spending boom 
fueled by strong household balance sheets and pent-up demand for 
consumer goods and services that were squashed during the pandemic. 
Third, a successful Democratic effort to legislate another massive near-
term increase in government spending. The $1.9 trillion in additional 
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spending sought by the Biden Administration is several times larger 
than the estimated output gap, as stressed by Summers (2021). If all 
three of these developments materialize in powerful ways, actual and 
expected inflation rates could rise quickly and sharply. See Bordo and 
Levy (2021) for a similar warning and some discussion of historical 
parallels.
The Fed’s new framework and its current policy stance raise the 
likelihood of this scenario and, if it emerges, make it more likely the 
Fed would be slow to respond. In that event, the Fed may find itself 
faced with undesirably high inflation rates, unanchored expectations 
about future inflation, a serious loss of credibility, rising risk premia, 
and a need to re-evaluate its policy framework yet again. That set of 
circumstances would spill over to credit conditions around the world 
-- raising borrowing costs, curtailing business investment, and driving 
large exchange rate adjustments. It would also involve a sizable increase 
in the flow cost of servicing U.S. public debt outstanding. The trajectory 
of U.S. fiscal deficits and debt-GDP ratios could quickly emerge as 
major economic and political issues.
II. Structural Shifts in the U.S. Economy
The 2020 U.S. elections took place amidst an extraordinary public 
health and economic crisis. Fortunately, the deployment of effective 
vaccines for the SARS-COV-2 virus is now underway, and it appears 
likely that the United States and other advanced economies will bring 
the pandemic under control in 2021. There is much to say about the 
pandemic, policy responses, and the economic consequences. Here, 
I confine my attention to certain structural shifts in the economy 
triggered by the pandemic.
The COVID-19 shock generated massive shifts in demand across 
and within industries. Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (2020, 2021a) provide 
evidence on the near, medium, and longer-term reallocative aspects 
of these shifts in the US economy. The evidence in their studies and 
others points to rapid acceleration in the growth of online shopping and 
delivery, high expected job and sales reallocation rates in the wake of 
the pandemic, a large upheaval in labor markets, less business travel 
and greater reliance on virtual meetings, and a huge shift to working 
from home. Davis et al. (2021) provide complementary evidence based 
on cross-sectional patterns in firm-level equity returns. 
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There are sound economic reasons to think that pandemic-induced 
shifts in consumer spending patterns, business practices, and working 
arrangements will partly stick. Millions of households have tried online 
shopping and delivery services in the past year. Some find they like it 
and will continue to value the convenience and (perceived) safety after 
the pandemic ends.2 Businesses plan for a 30 percent drop in their 
travel expenditures after the pandemic ends, as compared to the pre-
pandemic situation (Altig 2020a). After turning to virtual meetings 
out of necessity, many businesses are likely to see them as an easier, 
cheaper option to travel and in-person meetings in some circumstances. 
A persistent drop in business travel has profound implications for the 
travel and hospitality industries. 
These empirical observations point to large benefits of policies and 
policy reforms that facilitate a speedy reallocation of jobs, workers, 
and capital to newly productive uses in the wake of the pandemic. 
Policies that deter or slow reallocation are likely to further lengthen the 
lag of creation behind destruction, slowing the overall recovery from 
the pandemic, the lockdown, and the pandemic-induced reallocation 
shock. Barrero et al. (2020) develop this theme at some length. Policies 
that facilitate productive reallocation can also ease supply constraints 
and complement the role of fiscal and monetary policy in stabilizing 
demand. In turn, aggregate demand stabilization and monetary policy 
actions that ensure the smooth functioning of the financial system help 
set the stage for a speedier reallocation of jobs, workers, and capital to 
their most efficient uses.
Worker surveys suggest that employers plan for their full-time 
employees to supply about 20 percent of workdays from home after the 
pandemic ends, as compared to 5 percent before the pandemic (Barrero 
et al. 2021b). When asked directly, business executives say they expect 
full-time employees to supply about 15 percent of workdays from home 
after the pandemic ends (Altig 2020a). Barrero et al. (2021b) provide 
evidence on several mechanism behind a persistent shift to working 
from home: better-than-expected experiences when working from home 
during the pandemic, large new investments in physical and human 
capital that enable working from home, a greatly diminished stigma 
2 For examples of how this shift is playing out in groceries, restaurants and 
new automobile sales, see Mims (2020c), Naughton (2020) and Mims (2020b), 
respectively. 
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associated with working from home, lingering concerns about crowds 
and contagion risks, and a pandemic-driven surge in technological 
innovations that support working from home (Bloom et al. 2021). 
The shift to working from home raises questions about the future of 
the dense urban core in cities like New York and San Francisco, where 
a large share of commuters work in skill- and information-intensive jobs 
that are amenable to working from home (Althoff et al. 2020). Barrero 
et al. (2021) estimate that, relative to the pre-pandemic situation, the 
post-pandemic shift to working from home will lower post-COVID 
worker expenditures on meals, entertainment, and shopping in central 
business districts by 5 to 10 percent of taxable sales. This loss of sales 
tax revenues and a possibly large fall in the property tax base could add 
materially to the fiscal strains that were already facing many American 
cities before the pandemic. 
In light of these observations, the strength of economic recovery over 
the medium run in the United States and other countries will turn 
partly on whether policies facilitate or impede an effective adjustment 
response to unusual, and unusually large, shifts in the structure of 
demand and working arrangements.
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